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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(j). The 
appeal is of an order, judgment, or decree of a court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction but is transferred by the Supreme Court to the Court 
of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(4). 
RESPONSE TO ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. OBJECTION: The issues presented by Pinckney all fail to comply with the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(a)(5) requires either (A) a 
citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or (B) a statement 
of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. The statement of the 
issues provided by Pinckney contain neither one. 
2. Pinckney's first issue (under her "Issues Presented") was not determined by the trial 
court. Pinckney failed to prove that Snideman was a tenant, so the court never arrived at the 
issue of whether under such circumstances he would be a proper party. Rather, the court, 
unconvinced that Snideman was a tenant, viewed the action as a disguised attempt to obtain a 
more expeditious and favorable remedy than that provided under a trust deed foreclosure, 
finding that the trustor, a corporation, was the real party in interest. Pinckney attempts to 
convert the lower court's Finding of Fact #1 * and related factual determinations into an over-
generalized and inapplicable question of law. Pinckney's first issue, if purely a matter of law, 
would be more properly stated, As an assignee under a trust deed, can a plaintiff force a more 
bindings of Fact #1 states, "The real party in interest in this matter, rather than 
Defendant John David Snideman is a corporation named Prodigy Enterprises, Inc." See 
Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts for more detail. 
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speedy favorable remedy for default by alleging a fictitious, oral lease between a corporate 
trustor and its officer and thus avail itself of the use of the more expeditious remedies under the 
unlawful detainer statutes. 
3. Snideman does not need to be a party to a document to impose the reciprocal 
enforcement of attorney's fees. 
4. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are sufficient. 
PROVISIONS DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL 
A. STATUTE OF FRAUDS, Utah Code Annotated 25-5-1 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term 
not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning 
real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or 
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed 
by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or 
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by 
writing. 
B. Utah Code Annotated 78-27-56.5 Attorney's Fees-Reciprocal rights to recover 
Attorney's fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that 
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the 
provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees. 
C. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(a)(5) 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain 
under appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, 
including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with 
supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was 
preserved in the trial court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an 
issue not preserved in the trial court. 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 17(a) 
Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant. 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 17(d) 
Associates may sue or be sued by common name. When two or 
more persons associated in any business either as a joint-stock 
company, a partnership or other association, not a corporation, 
transact such business under a common name, whether it 
comprises the names of such associates or not, they may sue or be 
sued by such common name. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE. THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. AND ITS 
DISPOSITION. The trial court denied an unlawful detainer claim filed by Pinckney and 
awarded Snideman his costs and a reasonable attorney's fee (Record at 111). After two hearings 
(Record at 44, 107) on Pinckney's objections to the order, including, among other things, the 
reciprocal imposition of attorney's fees, and after considering Pinckney's alternative proposed 
findings and conclusions, the lower court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order (Record at 111). Pinckney appealed to the Utah Supreme Court (Record at 112) and 
filed a Motion for Summary Disposition. Snideman filed his Response in Opposition along with 
a Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 10 Motion for Summary Affirmation; Request for 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 33 Damages and Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 37 Suggestion of Mootness along with a Supporting Memorandum. On December 22, 
1999, the Supreme Court deferred ruling on the motions and suspended Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure Rule 10(d). On January 12, 2000, the Supreme Court ordered the transfer of the 
matter to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. Pursuant to order, a pre-hearing mediation 
conference was held February 14, 2000. Pinckney's Brief was filed March 31, 2000. 
2. PINCKNEY'S ORIGINAL CLAIM. Based on an assigned trust deed, Pinckney had 
fashioned her complaint as an unlawful detainer of real property, seeking damages for non-
payment on an alleged oral lease, along with costs and attorney's fees and possession from 
Snideman, a named officer of a corporation, Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. Her claim, however, was 
based on a note and deed of trust with Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. as the real party in interest. 
(Record at 3,4). At the same time, Pinckney was pursuing a trust deed foreclosure against the 
Page 4 
same property (Record 120, Transcript pg. 45, line 17-19). Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. alone was 
the signatory to the Trust Deed. (Record, Exhibit #3) 
3. SNIDEMAN'S POSITION. Snideman denied the existence of an oral lease or any 
such tenancy. Snideman claimed that Pinckney's action in unlawful detainer was a disguised 
attempt to obtain a more expeditious and favorable remedy by avoiding the statutory protections2 
provided by a statutory trust deed foreclosure (Record 9, 120 transcript, pages 5-8). Pinckney 
admitted that indeed, she would have no claim in unlawful detainer against the owner of the real 
property, the real party in interest3. On appeal, Pinckney continues her pursuit of the fiction that 
Snideman is a "renter" or a "tenant" even though its own drafted proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law states the opposite (Record at 53). Similarly inconsisentent, to fashion the 
facts to support her appeal, and caught in her argument over the issue of attorney's fees, 
Pinckney abandoned the fiction of an oral lease, asserting instead that "at the time of the 
unlawful detainer action being filed, Pinckney's attorney thought there was a written lease 
(Record, page 72). Contrary to such position, the complaint refers only to an oral lease in the 
context of the Trust Deed. The complaint sought reasonable attorney's fees under the unlawful 
detainer statute (Record 2-4). 
4. THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION. The trial court refrained from making a 
2Under Utah Code Annotated §57-1-31, a trustor has the right to cure within three 
months of the filing of a notice of default and is entitled to notice of the Trustee's sale 
and may bid thereon. The detailed procedural requirements for a trustee's sale of real 
property are intended to protect the debtor/trustor, and provide protections that substitute 
for the six-month right of redemption guaranteed injudicial mortgage foreclosures, Jones 
v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
3
"If they have a deed showing that he bought it, we are dead."Record 120, 
transcript, pages 9-10). 
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finding of an oral or written lease or that Snideman was a tenant. By doing so, Pinckney's 
fashioned claim of unlawful detainer was denied. After a bench trial, the trial court found that 
the real party in interest, rather than Defendant Snideman was the then owner of the real 
property, the corporation named Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. (Record, 109) The trial court denied 
the unlawful detainer claim, and awarded Snideman its costs and a reasonable attorney's fee. 
(Record, 111) Pinckney appealed. (Record, 113) Judge Hermansen, for the Trial Court, who 
heard opening statements, testimony and cross examination of six different witnesses, and 
closing arguments, succinctly stated: 
The Court finds from the documentary evidence received, that the 
real party in interest is the corporation (Record, 22). 
Except Exhibit "5" (discussed later), no documentary evidence even closely identifies 
Snideman as a Tenant. 
5. OTHER RELEVANT FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. The court also found that 
(finding #6) a non-judicial foreclosure of the subject trust deed is proceeding outside of the 
present action and concludes (Conclusion #2) that issues about obligations owed, if any, is more 
properly resolved in the foreclosure action. The court also made findings and conclusions as to 
the basis and amount of attorney's fees4 to be awarded Snideman. (Record 22, 108, 109) 
6. FACTS RELEVANT TO EXHIBIT 5, Pinckney's only claimed evidence of a lease 
4The record would show that the attorney's affidavit submitted after the first 
hearing was voluntarily reduced by over $1,000.00 for the time spent on negotiations 
regarding the default under the trust deed outside of the unlawful detainer action (Record 
56-59). At the final hearing on objections, buy interlineation, the Court reduced the 
award of attorney fees by an additional $1,000.00 to $3,418.03 as reasonable attorney's 
fees for that matter (Record 107). Snideman would contend that he should be entitled to 
the full amount, but has not raised the issue on appeal, leaving the question of the amount 
within the discretion of the court. 
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agreement is Exhibit "5". The court had ample justification to disregard it. The letter was on 
Tretheway (Pinckney's counsel) law office's stationary (Record 120, transcript, page77, line 3). 
From later testimony, Exhibit 5 was settlement discussion and inadmissable (Record 120, 
transcript, page 77, line 23 through page 78, line 9). It was prepared, negotiated, and executed 
after the instant litigation had commenced with a summons and complaint served (Record 120, 
transcript, page 81, lines 9-12). It was prepared and typed by Mr. Tretheway (Record 120, 
transcript page 81, line 17-23). Mr. Tretheway is not a disinterested party. He was Pinckney's 
attorney (and attorney in this matter) and signed the Exhibit (Record 120, transcript, page 79, 
Exhibit 5). Pinckney relied on Mr. Tretheway as to the security of the loan for which Mr. 
Tretheway received a percentage (Record 120, transcript, pages 23-24). Mr. Tretheway received 
an origination and guarantee fee from the sale of the property of $1,200.00. (Record 120, 
transcript, pages 33-34). Mr. Tretheway testified that he would be liable to Pinckney if the 
$20,000.00 was not paid, (Record 120, transcript, pages 33-34). Note payments were made to 
Mr. Tretheway (Record 120, transcript, page 83). Mr. Tretheway provided legal advice to 
Snideman, as well (Record 120, transcript, page 85). Snideman understood the payments 
referred to therein to be mortgage payments (Record 120, transcript, page 40). Exhibit 5 
mischaracterizes Snideman's payments as rent payments (Record 120, transcript page 83, line 8-
24) It was prepared without the aid of counsel for Snideman (Record 120, transcript, page 85). 
The document also misrepresented that a "default has been taken in the unlawful detainer 
action", when, in fact, there was no entry of default (Record 120, transcript, page 88, lines 16-
20), a fact especially observed by the court (Record, page 22). 
In her appeal, Pinckney seeks to ignore the trust deed-her only basis-and continues to 
pursue the fiction of an oral lease. Her pellucid reason for avoidance, certainly, is that the trust 
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deed points directly to the corporation as the real party in interest, sustaining the trial courts 
decision. She also seeks to avoid the imposition of attorney's fees by disregarding the trust 
deed. The appellate court should sustain the findings, conclusions and order of the trial court. 
SUMMARY OF POINTS OF ARGUMENT 
Pinckney "reaches" to formulate a question of law to overcome her failure to provide 
evidence or convince the court of the essential elements of her claim and overcome the fact that 
the corporation is the real party in interest. At the same time she was pursuing a trust deed 
foreclosure, Pinckney's action in unlawful detainer was a disguised attempt to obtain a more 
expeditious and favorable remedy. The trial court could never reach the issue of unlawful 
detainer because Pinckney never established that Snideman was a tenant or that there was an 
"oral" lease-instead, the only reliable evidence established the relationship of trustor/beneficiary 
under the trust deed, of which the trustor was a corporation-pointing to it as the real party in 
interest. Thus, the court held as a finding of fact that the corporation, not Snideman, was the real 
party in interest and concluded that issues about obligations owed, if any, is more properly 
resolved in the foreclosure action. Pinckney's failure is further evidenced by her failure to 
comply with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24 (a)(5), nor can she, since the issue was 
never determined by the trial court nor preserved for appeal. Even if such issue were 
appropriately determined and preserved, no reliable underlying factual evidence supports the 
issue. The appellate court should defer to the trial court's factual determination. The authority 
cited by Pinckney supports, rather than detracts from the lower court's findings. 
Pinckney should not be able to avoid the reciprocal imposition of attorney's fees by 
disclaiming the application of the document under which her complaint was brought and under 
which she originally sought attorney's fees. The findings of fact and conclusions of law clearly 
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provide the basis and authority for imposition of attorney's fees. 
Pinckney's appeal is frivolous and just damages including reasonable attorney fees 
should be awarded Snideman. 
ARGUMENTS 
1. PINCKNEY'S FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL WAS NOT DECIDED NOR REACHED 
BY THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court refrained from making a finding of an oral or written lease or that 
Snideman was a tenant. Pinckney simply failed to carry its burden. Such lease or tenancy was 
an essential element of fact to Pinckney's claim. No reliable evidence supported Pinckney's 
factual claim-rather the evidence pointed to the Corporation being the real party in interest. 
Snideman denied the existence of an oral lease or any such tenancy. Pinckney was also pursuing 
a trust deed foreclosure on the same property. Snideman, the sole shareholder and officer of the 
corporation owning the property, claimed that Pinckney's action in unlawful detainer was a 
disguised attempt to obtain a more expeditious and favorable remedy by avoiding the statutory 
protections5 provided by a statutory trust deed foreclosure (Record 9, 120 transcript, pages 5-8). 
The court agreed with Snideman by its findings and conclusions. After a bench trial, the trial 
court found that the real party in interest, rather than Defendant Snideman was the then owner of 
the real property, the corporation named Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. (Record, 109). The court also 
found that a foreclosure of the subject trust deed was proceeding outside of the present action 
5Under Section 57-1-31, Utah Code Annotated, a trustor has the right to cure 
within three months of the filing of a notice of default and is entitled to notice of the 
Trustee's sale and may bid thereon. The detailed procedural requirements for a trustee's 
sale of real property are intended to protect the debtor/trustor, and provide protections that 
substitute for the six-month right of redemption guaranteed injudicial mortgage 
foreclosures, Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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and concluded that issues about obligations owed, if any, is more properly resolved in the 
foreclosure action. Pinckney's fashioned claim of unlawful detainer was denied. Pinckney's 
first issue (under her "Issues Presented") was not determined by the trial court, rather, the trial 
court made no determination of the existence of a lease or tenancy. 
2. PINCKNEY'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE AND ATTEMPT TO 
FRAME HER ISSUE DOES NOT COMPORT WITH THE FACTS. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24 (a)(5) requires either (A) a citation to the 
record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or (B) a statement of grounds for 
seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. The statement of the issues provided 
by Pinckney contain neither one. Without the same, Sr'deman's response may be unnecessarily 
broad. 
Pinckney in presenting her first issue appears to attempt to convert the lower court's 
Finding of Fact #16 and related factual determinations into an over-generalized and inapplicable 
question of law. Pinckney's first issue, if purely a matter of law, would be more properly stated, 
As an assignee under a trust deed, can a plaintiff force a more speedy favorable remedy for 
default by alleging a fictitious, oral lease between a corporate trustor and its officer and thus 
avail itself of the use of the more expeditious remedies under the unlawful detainer statutes? 
Or, in application to the facts of the instant case 
Can a Plaintiff force a more speedy favorable conclusion by the use of the more 
expeditious remedies under the Unlawful Detainer Statutes as an assignee under a Trust Deed, 
and avoid the protections (right to cure default, right to notice of default, right to notice of sale, 
6Findings of Fact #1 states, "The real party in interest in this matter, rather than 
Defendant John David Snideman is a corporation named Prodigy Enterprises, Inc." See 
Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts for more detail. 
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and right of redemption) afforded the real party in interest, the property owner (which is a 
Corporation) by treating the payments under the trust deed as payments of rent under an oral, 
fictitious, lease between an officer of the Corporation and the Corporation? 
The answer to either issue, obviously, is a resounding "NO". 
Pinckney admitted that indeed, she would have no claim in unlawful detainer against the 
owner of the real property7. On appeal, Pinckney continues her pursuit of the fiction that 
Snideman is a "renter" or a "tenant" even though her own drafted proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law states the opposite (Record at 53). Similarly inconsistent, to fashion the facts 
to support her appeal, and caught in her argument over the issue of attorney's fees, Pinckney 
abandoned the fiction of an oral lease, asserting instead that "at the time of the unlawful detainer 
action being filed, Pinckney's attorney thought there was a written lease (Record, page 72). 
Contrary to such position, the complaint refers only to an oral lease in the context of the Trust 
Deed and sought reasonable attorney's fees under the unlawful detainer statute (Record 2-4). 
The actions and various positions of Pinckney not only militate against denial of appeal, but for 
imposition of sanctions, as previously made by motion to the Utah Supreme Court, now pending 
before the Court of Appeals. 
3. DEFERENCE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL DETERMINATION 
SHOULD BE MADE UNLESS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The appellate court should defer to the trial court's assessment and determination of 
factual matters. Judge Hermansen, for the Trial Court, who heard opening statements, testimony 
and cross examination of six different witnesses, and closing arguments, succinctly stated: 
7
"If they have a deed showing that he bought it, we are dead."Record 120, 
transcript, pages 9-10). 
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The Court finds from the documentary evidence received, that the 
real party in interest is the corporation (Record, 22). 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 17(a) requires every action to be prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 17(d) regarding associated 
parties specifically excludes Corporations from its application. Even though Snideman owned 
all, or practically all, of the stock of the corporation, such a fact does not qualify him as the real 
party in interest, Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979). 
Snideman, despite his association with the Corporation, was not the real party in interest and 
could not be liable for what the court found to be a corporate concern-notwithstanding the effort 
of Pinckney to create a fictitious, oral8 lease. 
4. EXHIBIT "5" SHOULD BE DISREGARDED. 
Pinckney's only claimed evidence of a lease agreement relies on Exhibit "5" a letter on 
Tretheway (Pinckney's counsel) law office's stationary (Record 120, transcript, page77, line 3). 
The court had ample justification to disregard it: 
A. Settlement Discussion is Inadmissable. From later testimony, Exhibit 5 was 
settlement discussion and inadmissable (Record 120, transcript, page 77, line 23 
through page 78, line 9). 
B. Facts can yt be "built" by subsequently created documents. It was prepared, 
negotiated, and executed after the instant litigation had commenced with a 
summons and complaint served (Record 120, transcript, page 81, lines 9-12). 
C. Presumptions go against its creator, Pinckney's attorney. It was prepared and 
8Even if Pinckney had submitted evidence as to an oral lease, such would also fail 
due to the Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Annotated §25-5-1. 
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typed by Mr. Tretheway (Record 120, transcript page 81, line 17-23). 
D. Pinckney had an unfair advantage in its creation. Mr. Tretheway is not a 
disinterested party. He was Pinckney's attorney (and attorney in this matter) and 
signed the Exhibit (Record 120, transcript, page 79, Exhibit 5). 
E. Pinckney relied on Creator's legal acumen to maintain security. Pinckney relied 
on Mr. Tretheway as to the security of the loan for which Mr. Tretheway received 
a percentage (Record 120, transcript, pages 23-24). 
F. Snideman also received legal advice from Tretheway, its creator. Mr. Tretheway 
provided legal advice to Snideman (Record 120, transcript, page 85). 
G. Mr. Tretheway had a personal interest not disclosed in the document. Mr. 
Tretheway received an origination and guarantee fee from the sale of the property 
of $1,200.00. (Record 120, transcript, pages 33-34). 
H. Mr. Tretheway had a personal liablity not disclosed in the document. Mr. 
Tretheway testified that he would be liable to Pinckney if the $20,000.00 was not 
paid, (Record 120, transcript, pages 33-34). 
I. Mr. Tretheway was a participant in the underlying transaction. Note payments 
were made to Mr. Tretheway (Record 120, transcript, page 83). 
J. The document fails to reflect the understanding of the parties. Snideman 
understood the payments referred to therein to be mortgage payments (Record 
120, transcript, page 40). 
K. The document has no basis in fact as to essential elements. Exhibit 5 
mischaracterizes Snideman's payments as rent payments (Record 120, transcript 
page 83, line 8-24) 
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L. Overreaching. It was prepared without the aid of counsel for Snideman. (Record 
120, transcript, page 85). 
M. The document misrepresented key-material facts. The document also 
misrepresented that a "default has been taken in the unlawful detainer action", 
when, in fact, there was no entry of default (Record 120, transcript, page 88, lines 
16-20), a fact especially observed by the court (Record, page 22). 
5. THE AUTHORITY CITED BY PINCKNEY SUPPORTS, RATHER THAN 
DETRACTS FROM THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINGS. 
The authority cited by Pinckney supports, rather than detracts from the lower court's 
findings, making perhaps a more compelling argument for Snideman. In the sole authority cited 
by Pinckney on this issue, Pearce v. Schurtz, 270 P2d 442 (Utah 1954), page 443, the bond for 
deed (then used similarly as a trust deed) 
"expressly provided that upon default the buyer at seller's election 
became at once a tenant at will of the seller". 
In Pearce, the court found that 
"this provision was undoubtedly adopted to obtain the benefits of 
the unlawful detainer statute. Such was the express provision of 
the contract and this court will not rewrite the agreement. It is not 
within our province to torture some other meaning out of the bond 
for deed..." 
Even with the express provision, the Supreme Court in Pearce was divided and had 
difficulty imposing the unlawful detainer provisions under circumstances arising from a Deed of 
Conveyance. Justice Crockett in Pearce in his extensive dissenting opinion believed that 
notwithstanding the express provision "the artificial relationship of tenancy at will was not 
created, and the action of unlawful detainer should be dismissed." 
The express provision contained in Pearce creating a tenancy is not present in the instant 
Page 14 
case. No such provision is contained in the trust deed or any other document. Indeed, in her 
Complaint, Pinckney attempted to torture the note and trust deed of a purchase transaction into 
an "oral " lease agreement and thereby obtain the benefits of the unlawful detainer statute. The 
court in Pearce would not permit the facts to be tortured to avoid the unlawful detainer statute. 
A fortiori, the trial court in the instant matter should not countenance Pinckney's torture of the 
facts to bring it within the unlawful detainer statute and the appellate court should uphold the 
decision of the trial court. 
6. RESPONSE TO PINCKNEY'S SECOND ISSUE, MORE PROPERLY STATED AS, 
CAN PINCKNEY AVOID THE RECIPROCAL IMPOSITION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES BY 
DISCLAIMING THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCUMENT UNDER WHICH HER 
COMPLAINT WAS BROUGHT AND UNDER WHICH SHE ORIGINALLY SOUGHT 
ATTORNEY'S FEES? 
The trial court made findings and conclusions as to the basis and amount of 
attorney's fees9 to be awarded Snideman. (Record 22, 108, 109) The lower court found, after 
stating its findings as to the position of the parties with respect to certain documents that 
"7. The subject All-inclusive Trust Deed Note and All Inclusive 
Trust Deed provide for at least one party to recovery (sic) attorney 
fees, [and] 8. The reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded 
Defendant in this matter is the sum of $3,418.03." 
It concluded that 
"3. Under Section 78-27-56.5, the Court may award attorney's fees 
to the prevailing party [and] 4. Defendant should be awarded its 
9The record would show that the attorney's affidavit submitted after the first 
hearing was voluntarily reduced by over $1,000.00 for the time spent on negotiations 
regarding the default under the trust deed outside of the unlawful detainer action. At the 
final hearing on objections, buy interlineation, the Court reduced the award of attorney 
fees by an additional $1,000.00 to $3,418.03 as reasonable attorney's fees for that matter. 
Snideman would contend that he should be entitled to the full amount, but has not raised 
the issue on appeal, leaving the question of the amount within the discretion of the court. 
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costs and a reasonable attorney's fees." 
The order appealed from reflects such findings and conclusions. 
U.C.A. Section 78-27-56.5 states that 
"A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a 
civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing 
executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees." 
The essential elements of the statute are certainly fulfilled. Snideman prevailed in a civil 
action based upon a trust deed executed after April 28, 1986 which provided for Pinckney to 
recover attorney's fees. The statute imposes no requirement that the prevailing party be a party 
to the writing, as contended by Pinckney, with good reason. Otherwise, any defendant that 
prevails against a writing by proving its inefficacy would be denied its recovery of attorney's 
fees-rendering the statute meaningless. 
Pinckney contends error since Snideman was not a party to the Agreement, yet in 
her complaint she seeks attorney's fees from Snideman. Pinckney claims that since she failed to 
convince the court to adopt the fiction of an oral lease construed from the Trust Deed, that her 
failure disposes of any basis for reciprocal attorney fees. Even though her Complaint (Record, 
2-4) refers extensively to the All-inclusive Trust Deed which is the basis of her Complaint and is 
the only document by which she sought attorney's fees in her original Complaint, Pinckney 
contends that on appeal, there is no note, contract, or other writing, and thus no attorney fees. 
The statute does not condition the reciprocal rights of attorneys fees upon a Defendant 
proving the viability of an unfavorable document imposed upon him by a Plaintiffs suit. The 
statute should not be construed to deny a Defendant its reciprocal right of attorney fees if in his 
defense, he convinces the court to disregard, nullify, void, or determine the non-existence of 
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such unfavorable document-or, as in this case, to disregard the fiction of a lease. 
Similarly, in 4447 Associates v. First Security Financial 973 P.2d 992 (Court of Appeals 
of Utah, January 22, 1999), the non-prevailing party attempted to avoid the imposition of 
attorney's fees. There, an agreement providing for attorney's fees had been extinguished and 
replaced by an agreement (that did not provide for attorney's fees) upon which suit was made. 
The extinguished agreement provided for attorney's fees for actions "arising from" the same. 
The appellate court held that uAt bottom, Zions/4447 brought this suit to enforce the payment 
terms of [the extinguished agreement]". The appellate court, in 4447 Associates not only 
affirmed the trial court in awarding attorney fees, but also awarded attorney fees on appeal. 
Pinckney's authority is not on point and is distinguishable. Maynard v. Wharton, 912 
P2d 446) denied attorney's fees because "Seller's did not establish that buyers defaulted on any 
covenant or agreement and thus have no basis for an award of attorney fees." Such elements are 
not present in the instant case. Wardley Corporation v. Welsh, 962 P2d 86, dealt with third-party 
beneficiaries and declined to address arguments made as to U.C.A.78-27-56.5. 
Pinckney claimed attorney's fees in her Complaint. Her basis was the Trust 
Deed. She should now be estopped from claiming its inapplicability. To fail to do so would 
render Section 78-27-56.5 meaningless. To fail to do so would mean that any potential Plaintiff 
with any contract providing attorney's fees for its enforcement could sue without fear of the 
imposition of Section 78-27-56.5. For under Pinckney's theory, if a Defendant raises a claim of 
any sort that might render the contract invalid or otherwise negated and prevails on that claim, 
the Plaintiff-the losing party-could then avoid the imposition of attorney's fees by claiming "no 
contract, thus no attorney's fees". Certainly, such is not contemplated by the statute. 
7. PINCKNEY, IN HER ARGUMENT OVER HER ISSUE #2 CLAIMS 
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INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AS TO ATTORNEY'S FEES, YET HAS FAILED TO 
PROPERLY RAISE SUCH ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
The issue has not been properly raised, being "added in" Pinckney's claimed issue of 
law. Furthermore, Pinckney has not fulfilled the requirement of marshalling the evidence with 
regard to the same. Had she marshalled the evidence, she would have found several copies of 
the affidavit for attorney's fees, the earliest of which was date-stamped September 20, 1999 
(Record 120, transcript 56-59). Though Pinckney received a copy on July 6, 1999 (record, page 
101), she apparently is concerned that the court has still not located the original that was 
delivered to the Court on July 6, 1998, by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested and received 
by one "JM". Snideman should not be penalized for a court's apparent administrative mistake. 
Furthermore, the matter was discussed in open court (Record, 107) with the fees reduced by an 
additional $1,000.00. In any event, the court having heard the case could make its independent 
determination of what would constitute a reasonable attorney's fee. It apparently did so, thus the 
reduction by interlineation. 
8. RESPONSE TO PINCKNEY'S THIRD ISSUE, THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER PROVIDE FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
As previously stated in response to Pinckney's Issue 2, the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (Record, 110) contain the essential elements for the award of attorney's 
fees. 
The lower court found, after stating its findings as to the position of the parties with 
respect to certain documents that 
"7. The subject All-Inclusive Trust Deed Note and All Inclusive 
Trust Deed provide for at least one party to recovery (sic) attorney 
fees, [and] 8. The reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded 
Defendant in this matter is the sum of $3,418.03." 
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It concluded that 
"3. Under Section 78-27-56.5, the Court may award attorney's fees 
to the prevailing party [and] 4. Defendant should be awarded its 
costs and a reasonable attorney's fees." 
The order appealed from reflects such findings and conclusions. 
Pinckney's contentions approach the absurd on this issue and become frivolous without 
factual basis. The Findings, Conclusions, and Order are clear on the theory of attorney's fees 
being awarded. Pinckney's failure to prove her case should not impose an obligation on 
Snideman to prove part of Pinckney's case in order to benefit from the reciprocal award of 
attorney's fees. The authority cited by Pinckney, Maynard V. Wharton, 912 P.2d 446 (Utah Ct. 
App.), cert. Denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996) that Snideman " must show that the contract's 
provisions contemplate that award" simply is oxymoronic when considered against Utah Code 
Annotated, §78-27-56.5, the reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees, designed to prevent 
drafting documents denying reciprocal rights. 
9. PINCKNEY'S APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS AND JUST DAMAGES INCLUDING 
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED 
The Supreme Court deferred consideration of Snideman's Request for Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure Rule 33 Damages and Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 37 
Suggestion of Mootness. Argument regarding the same are not here repeated. As the appellate 
court, in 4447 Associates not only affirmed the trial court in awarding attorney fees, but also 
awarded attorney fees on appeal, so should the same be awarded Snideman. 
CONCLUSION 
From a bench trial, the trial court denied an unlawful detainer claim filed by Pinckney 
and awarded Snideman his costs and a reasonable attorney's fee. Though fashioned as an 
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unlawful detainer claim on an oral lease, her claim was based on a note and deed of trust with 
Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. against whom, at the same time, Pinckney was pursuing a trust deed 
foreclosure. Snideman, the sole shareholder and officer of Prodigy, denied the existence of an 
oral lease or any such tenancy, claiming that Pinckney's action in unlawful detainer was a 
disguised attempt to obtain a more expeditious and favorable remedy than the ongoing trust deed 
foreclosure. No reliable evidence supported the existence of an oral lease or tenancy. The trial 
court found the corporation, rather than Snideman, to be the real party in interest. The court also 
found that foreclosure of the subject trust deed was proceeding outside of the present action, 
concluding that issues about obligations owed, if any, is more properly resolved in the 
foreclosure action. The court also made findings and conclusions as to the basis and amount of 
attorney's fees to be awarded Snideman, based on the statutory reciprocal rights to recover 
attorney's fees. 
On appeal, Pinckney seeks to ignore the trust deed-her only basis-and continues to 
pursue the fiction of an oral lease. The trust deed points directly to the corporation as the real 
party in interest, sustaining the trial courts decision. She also seeks to avoid the imposition of 
attorney's fees by again disregarding the trust deed and further disclaiming any agreement 
between the parties-inconsistent with her claim and her earlier argument. 
The appellate court should defer to the trial court's factual determination. Pinckney 
relies on a single authority, Pearce, as permitting an unlawful detainer to be pursued against 
Snideman. Pearce, however, is factually different and frankly supports the position of Snideman 
rather than Pinckney. 
Pinckney should not be able to avoid the reciprocal imposition of attorney's fees by 
disclaiming the application of the document under which her complaint was brought and under 
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which she herself originally sought attorney's fees. The findings of fact and conclusions of law 
clearly provide the basis and authority for imposition of attorney's fees. 
The appellate court should not only uphold the trial court's order in all respects, but 
should also consider and grant Snideman's motion for sanctions. 
NO ADDENDUM IS REQUIRED UNDER Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure RULE 
24(a)(ll). 
Respectfully submitted, 
Date 
Thomas J. Klc, Attorney for 
Appellee Snideman 
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